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Recent Decisions
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - DUE PROCESS - COMBINATION OF
INVESTIGATORY AND ADJUDICATORY FUNCTIONS IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BODY DOES NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS - Withrow v. Larkin.-
The Wisconsin Medical Examining Board, pursuant to statute,2 noti-
fied Dr. Duane Larkin in June 1973 that it would hold an investigative
hearing to determine whether Dr. Larkin had engaged in acts proscribed
by the Wisconsin statutes.3 Dr. Larkin sought to enjoin the hearing in
a Wisconsin Federal District Court.4 This relief was denied, and the
hearing was held in July 1973. 5 On the basis of its investigation, the Board
notified Dr. Larkin in September 1973 that it would conduct a contested
hearing to determine whether Dr. Larkin's license to practice medicine
should be suspended.6 Dr. Larkin then obtained a temporary restraining
order requiring postponement of the "contested hearing"7 until a three-
judge court could determine whether the Board's license suspension pro-
cedure violated due process by permitting the Board to act as both
investigator and adjudicator in the same proceeding.8 The Board obeyed
1. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
2. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 448.17 (1974) provides:
The examining board shall investigate, hear and act upon practices by per-
sons licensed to practice medicine and surgery ... that are inimical to the public
health. The examining board shall have the power to warn and to reprimand,
when it finds such practice, and to institute criminal action or action to revoke
license when it finds probable cause therefor under criminal or revocation statute,
and the attorney general may aid the district attorney in the prosecution thereof.
Section 448.18(2) authorizes the district attorney to bring a civil license
revocation action against a doctor upon receipt of a "verified complaint" charging
the doctor with "immoral or unprofessional conduct," as specified in section 448.18(1),
or with having procured his license by fraud or perjury or through error. Section
448.18(7) authorizes the examining board itself to suspend a doctor's license for up
to six months without formal proceedings, subject to review under the Wisconsin
Administrative Procedure Act, Wis. STAT. ANN. ch. 227 (1957) & (Supp. 1975).
3. The hearing was to be a closed, non-adversary proceeding, 421 U.S. at 39, to
determine whether Dr. Larkin had "engaged in conduct unbecoming a person licensed
to practice medicine ...." Id. at 39 n.2 .
4. Dr. Larkin had filed for injunctive relief and a temporary restraining order
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), claiming that no specific charges were con-
tained in the Board's notice and that the action was to punish him for performing
abortions. Larkin v. Withrow, 368 F. Supp. 793, 794 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
5. 421 U.S. at 39-40.
6. Id. at 40-41. The specific charges against Dr. Larkin were that he had
practiced medicine under an assumed name, had permitted an unlicensed physician to
perform abortions in his abortion clinic, and had engaged in fee splitting. Id. at 40
n.4.
7. 368 F. Supp. at 796.
8. As stated by the three-judge district court in the decision granting a pre-
liminary injunction, the issue was whether the Examining Board could temporarily
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the restraining order and abandoned the "contested hearing." Instead, it
held a final "investigative session" in which it made findings of fact and
conclusions of law, followed by a "decision" noting probable cause for a
civil action to revoke Dr. Larkin's license.9
The three-judge court subsequently issued a preliminary injunction
preventing the Board from conducting a "contested hearing" in Dr.
Larkin's case.10 The court ruled that because Dr. Larkin's license could
be suspended without the intervention of an "independent decision-
maker,"" his due process challenge to the statute had a "high likelihood
of success.' 2 The Board appealed and the Supreme Court noted probable
jurisdiction. 13 In a unanimous opinion written by Mr. Justice White,
the Court held that it was "quite unlikely" that Dr. Larkin would prevail
on his due process argument and that the district court had abused its
discretion by issuing the preliminary injunction. 14  The Court rejected
Dr. Larkin's claim that the Board's combination of investigatory and
adjudicatory functions precluded a fair adjudicatory hearing,15 stating
that "[t] he mere exposure to evidence presented in nonadversary investiga-
tive procedure is insufficient in itself to impugn the fairness of the Board
suspend Dr. Larkin's license "at its own contested hearings on charges evolving from
its own investigation" without denying him procedural due process of law. Larkin v.
Withrow, 368 F. Supp. 796, 797 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
9. 421 U.S. at 41. Pursuant to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 448.18(2) (1974), discussed
in note 2 supra, the Board filed a complaint with the Milwaukee County District
Attorney to institute license revocation and possible criminal proceedings. Id. at 42.
10. 368 F. Supp. at 798. The initial opinion of the three-judge court declared
section 448.18(7) unconstitutional, and an injunction was issued against its enforcement.
However, on the basis of Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310
(1940), which prohibited a ruling on the constitutionality of a state statute in an
action for preliminary injunction prior to a final hearing or determination, the three-
judge court modified its ruling to preliminarily enjoin the Board from applying
section 448.18(7) against Dr. Larkin personally. 421 U.S. at 42-43.
11. 368 F. Supp. at 797.
12. 421 U.S. at 43 n.6. The reasons for the modified judgment are discussed in
note 10 supra. For a discussion of Larkin v. Withrow and this area of the law
generally, see Comment, Procedural Due Process and the Separation of Functions
in State Occupational Licensing Agencies, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 833.
13. 417 U.S. 943 (1974). The Supreme Court could have remanded the case
without considering the substantive issues because the district court had failed to
make the findings of fact and conclusions required by Rule 52(a) and to state the
reasons for issuance of the injunction, as required by Rule 65(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure; however, because the case turned upon the structure of
the disciplinary process and not upon a unique set of facts, the Court chose to hear
the case. 421 U.S. at 44-46.
14. 421 U.S. at 46.
15. With respect to discipline of physicians, Maryland has avoided the com-
bination of functions that was at issue in Withrow. The responsibility for investiga-
tion is placed upon local committees of the Medical and Chirurgical Faculty of the
State of Maryland, which make recommendations to the Commission on Medical
Discipline of Maryland regarding any necessary actions. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§ 1 30(g) (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
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members at a later adversary hearing."'u The Court held further that
the Board's finding that there was probable cause to believe that Dr.
Larkin had violated the Wisconsin statutes did not bar it from holding
subsequent adjudicatory hearings on the charges. It pointed out that in
judicial proceedings, judges are not prevented by due process from pre-
siding in cases where they have made pretrial determinations of probable
cause to issue arrest warrants, or where they have initially assessed the
facts in allowing or denying preliminary injunctive relief. 17
It is generally recognized that an impartial decisionmaker is required
by due process.' 8 This does not mean, however, that the decisionmaker
must be completely indifferent.' 9 Rather, due process requires only that
the decisionmaker not prejudge a specific case, or be so biased against a
party as to be incapable of properly deciding his case according to the
weight of the evidence. 20 Courts have identified certain situations in which
the risk of prejudice or bias on the part of the decisionmaker is so great
that it is presumed to exist to an unconstitutional degree without requiring
an actual showing of bias. This presumption arises in situations such as
where the decisionmaker has a pecuniary interest, 21 where he has acted
16. 421 U.S. at 55.
17. Id. at 55-56.
18. "Concededly, a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.'" 421 U.S. at 46, quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
19. It has been recognized that general bias in an administrator may be helpful
in carrying out the policy goals of an agency. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948); Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative Process, 59
Nw. U.L. REv. 216, 227-29 (1964).
20. Courts speak in terms of finding a "risk of bias" because actual bias is
difficult to prove. To find actual bias a court may be required to "read the mind"
of a decisionmaker. Finding a "risk of bias" requires only that the court objectively
examine the facts of the case in light of normal human behavior. See Pillsbury Co.
v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966) ; cf. text accompanying note 32 infra.
There have been cases in which biased conduct has been so pronounced that courts
have found actual bias. E.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973), where the court found the trial judge's
attitude toward the defense to be "deprecatory and often antagonistic," id. at 386,
and his rulings to be against the defense in a disproportionately large percentage of
situations. Id. at 387.
A decision made as a result of bias is invalid because it is based upon con-
siderations that are not properly before the decisionmaker as evidence. For the same
reason, a decision reached as a result of pressure exerted upon the decisionmaker is
also invalid. See, e.g., D.C. Federation of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972), where the court invalidated a decision
by the Secretary of Transportation because pressure exerted by a congressman on
the Secretary had influenced his decision. The court held that such pressure in-
validated the decision because it went to matters outside the proper scope of the
Secretary's decisionmaking process in that case. Id. at 1247-48. See generally Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
21. E.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510 (1927).
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as advocate for one of the parties involved in the controversy at issue,22
or where he has been the target of personal abuse from one of the parties. 28
Beyond situations of this sort, courts have been reluctant to disqualify a
decisionmaker on the mere possibility of bias.2 4
The weight of authority has been that a mere combination of investiga-
tive and adjudicative functions does not by itself pose such a risk of bias
or prejudice as to violate due process. 25 The courts have used various
formulations to determine the point at which the intensity or extent of the
investigation renders the risk of bias in adjudication unconstitutional. The
most instructive line of inquiry was explored by two federal courts which
22. E.g., TWA v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958), in which the Solicitor
of the Post Office Department filed a brief for one of the parties and then later,
as a member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, cast the deciding vote at the subsequent
hearing; Mishawaka v. Stewart, 261 Ind. 670, 310 N.E.2d 65 (1974), in which the
court held that a city attorney could not be an advocate for one of the parties in an
administrative proceeding and also participate in the determination of actual issues.
23. See, e.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) ; Pickering v. Board of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968). A good analysis of the bias-creating circumstances that call
for disqualification appears in F. Davis, Withrow v. Larkin and the "Separation of
Functions" Concept in State Administrative Proceedings, 27 AD. L. REV. 407, 409-10
(1975).
24. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927), in which the Supreme Court
asserted that most instances of alleged bias do not rise to a constitutional level.
Courts are particularly unwilling to disqualify a decisionmaker where no
substitute tribunal can be assembled to decide the case. In Brinkley v. Hassig, 83
F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1936), a doctor whose license had been revoked because of
unprofessional conduct sought to overturn the revocation on the ground that the
state medical board members were prejudiced against him. The court determined
that the members were prejudiced against the doctor, but relief was refused, largely
because the medical board was the only tribunal empowered to revoke a doctor's
license, and if it were disqualified because of bias arising from pre-hearing pub-
licity, the doctor would have, in effect, an irrevocable license to practice. Id. at
357. This "doctrine of necessity" was also implicitly applied by the Supreme Court
in FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948). As noted by Professor Davis,
however, this "necessity doctrine" may be misapplied:
Perhaps the aspect of the law about bias that is most in need of critical re-
examination is the application of the rule of necessity. The courts often hold
that judges or officers who are disqualified must nevertheless be allowed to make
decisions when no provision has been made for a substitute tribunal. The use
of the rule of necessity may often be desirable, but the courts in some cases may
be too readily yielding to apparent "necessity," with the result that decisions made
by seriously disqualified officers are allowed to stand.
2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.06 at 169-70 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIs].
25. See, e.g., Pangburn v. CAB, 311 F.2d 349, 356 (1st Cir. 1962); Belizaro v.
Zimmerman, 200 F.2d 282, 283 (3d Cir. 1952); Koelling v. Board of Trustees, 259
Iowa 1185, 1204, 146 N.W.2d 284, 295 (1966) ; DAVIS, supra note 24, § 13.02 (Supp.
1970) ; 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW at 25-26. But see Amos Treat &
Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Pregent v. New Hampshire Dep't of
Employment Security, 361 F. Supp. 782, 797 (D.N.H. 1973) (dicta) ; Gardner v.
Repasky, 434 Pa. 126, 252 A.2d 704 (1969).
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upheld lias claims. In King v. Caesar Rodney School District,26 a school
board sought to dismiss a tenured teacher. The school board held a pre-
liminary hearing, found "just cause" to terminate, and sought to hold a
termination hearing as required by state statute. The district court sus-
tained the teacher's due process objection because the preliminary investiga-
tion had been so thorough and the minds of the board members had become
so fixed that the procedural guarantees afforded by the statutory termina-
tion hearing had been rendered "meaningless.12 7  Similar analysis was
used in American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC,28 in which Federal Trade Com-
mission Chairman Dixon, who had worked on the investigation of the
case in his former capacity as chief counsel for a senate subcommittee,
sat as one of the decisionmakers. The court analyzed the due process
challenge to Dixon's dual role by examining the apparent extent of his
bias. It noted that he had formed conclusions about the factual issues
involved in the case prior to the contested hearing.29 Thus, the court's
decision was based not on the mere existence of combined functions, but
on the degree of bias the combined functions had engendered:
We do not hold that the service of Mr. Dixon as counsel for the
subcommittee, standing alone, necessarily would require disqualifica-
tion. Our decision is based upon the depth of the investigation and
the questions and comments by Mr. Dixon as counsel as shown by the
record in this case .... 30
Both cases found an unconstitutional risk of bias by pointing to a closed
mind on the part of the decisionmaker. Absent such a showing, courts
will assume that the administrative decisionmaker is capable of properly
adjudicating the issues.A' The Court in Withrow reaffirmed this central
principle:
The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative
functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in ad-
26. 380 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1974).
27. Id. at 1119.
28. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
29. Id. at 765.
30. Id. at 768.
31. Many administrative agencies, as legislative creations, are designed to operate
with a degree of built-in bias:
Administrative agencies were established to do supplementary lawmaking, that
is to gather and evaluate facts and establish policy positions. They were also
intended to judge individual cases. Inevitably this combination means that the
men doing the judging are the inventors and proponents of the very policy, and
the compilers of the very facts, challenged by the individual in proceedings,
before the agency. The courts have recognized that this was the inevitable and
intended effect of establishing a system of administrative regulation and have
confined the notion of bias largely to personal financial interests in the outcome
of a proceeding on the part of the decision maker.
M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIEs 136-37 (1968).
See also Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 79 (10th Cir. 1972) ; FTC v.
Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
note 19 sufpra.
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ministrative adjudication... must overcome a presumption of honesty
and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human
weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers in the
same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that
the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be
adequately implemented.8 2
The opinion in Withrow undercut some of the basis of the decision in
King, specifically the notion that a "substantial pre-hearing familiarity
by the decisionmakers with the facts of the case disqualifies them from
ruling on those facts."8 8 The decision in King remains valid, however,
because the excessively thorough preliminary hearing led to the "closed
mind" that courts have traditionally required in order to find an uncon-
stitutional risk of bias.
In criminal proceedings, due process requires that substantial tradi-
tional procedural safeguards be carefully observed, but due process is a
more flexible concept in the administrative context.8 4 In many cases if a
party is accorded adequate notice and a fair hearing, administrative agen-
cies need not employ particular procedural methods.8 5 In Simard v. Board
of Education,6 the board sought to dismiss a non-tenured teacher. Some
board members had had prior dealings with the teacher in his capacity as
a salary negotiator. Because the salary discussions had been heated, the
teacher claimed that the board members had become prejudiced against
him. The court dismissed the claim by invoking the flexibility of due
process:
[Ilt is unrealistic to require a Connecticut town to provide more than
one body to deal with various aspects of school administration. We
do not believe that due process, varying as it does with differing
factual contexts, requires so much in this case, absent a showing of
actual, rather than potential, bias. 7
32. 421 U.S. at 47.
33. 380 F. Supp. at 1119.
34. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process in one context may not neces-
sarily satisfy procedural due process in every case. Thus, procedures adequate
to determine a welfare claim may not suffice to try a felony charge. Compare
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 270-71, with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
35. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
For a discussion of procedures required as due process in various specific administra-
tive proceedings, see K. Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HA.v.
L. REV. 193 (1956). For example, administrative agencies are not required to use
traditional rules of evidence in quasi-judicial proceedings, FTC v. Cement Institute,
333 U.S. 683, 705-06 (1948).
36. 473 F.2d 988 (2d Cir. 1973).
37. Id. at 993.
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Underlying this policy of flexibility toward the administrative process is
an understanding that flexibility is essential to the viability of administra-
tive structures. In Richardson v. Perales,8s which dealt with the appli-
cability of traditional evidence rules to Social Security disability hearings,
the Court responded to a combination of functions challenge by asserting
that the challenge "assume[d] too much and would bring down too many
procedures designed, and working well, for a government structure of
great and growing complexity."3 9 The Court in Withrow similarly as-
serted that "[t]he incredible variety of administrative mechanisms in this
country will not yield to any single organizing principle. ' 40 Whereas
procedural regularity is the keystone of criminal due process, the admin-
istrative structure requires flexibility to deal with a variety of situations.
In holding that the procedures at issue in Withrow were constitu-
tionally permissible, the Court relied upon its decisions in FTC v. Cement
Institute4' and NLRB v. Donnelly Garment Co.42 Although neither is
directly on point, both cases illustrate the high standard of proof necessary
to establish a due process violation, and the Court's reluctance to interfere
with procedural practices of the agencies involved. In Cement Institute,
Federal Trade Commission members were found to have formed opinions
regarding price fixing in the cement industry, which they were then
investigating. These Commissioners believed that price fixing was taking
place in the industry, and they believed that it was illegal. Addressing
the fifth amendment due process challenge to the members' subsequent
adjudicatory role, the Court held that there had been no denial of due
process, as there was no showing of a closed mind on the part of any
Commissioner with regard to the case at hand.43 The Court further noted
that it had not been shown that the opinions of the Commissioners could
not be changed once the Cement Institute presented its defense at the
adjudicatory hearing.44 In Donnelly, it was held constitutionally per-
missible for an administrative trial examiner to preside at a remand and
38. 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
39. Id. at 410.
40. 421 U.S. at 52.
41. 333 U.S. 683 (1948), discussed in 421 U.S. at 47-49.
42. 330 U.S. 219 (1947), discussed in 421 U.S. at 49.
43. Id. at 700-01; accord Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Locke, 60 F.2d 35 (2d
Cir. 1932), in which the participation of a Deputy Commissioner of the Employees
Compensation Commission in a Workmen's Compensation proceeding was upheld in
spite of a showing that the Deputy Commissioner had formed a strong opinion con-
cerning the merits of the case prior to the hearing. The Commission's order was
affirmed because the Deputy Commissioner's comments "fell short of a statement that
nothing that might be shown at . . . [the] hearing would change his mind." Id. at
38. These cases implicitly reject, for administrative proceedings, the dicta in Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), which warned against accepting even the "possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to
convict .. . ." Id. at 532.
44. 333 U.S. at 701.
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hear evidence that he had excluded as irrelevant during the first trial. The
Court in Donnelly was troubled by the possible lack of fairness in the
procedure, and suggested that a different examiner might have been sup-
plied,45 but concluded that if judges could hear cases on remand after
ruling on them so could administrative agencies. 46
The district court in Withrow 47 had based its finding of probable
unconstitutionality substantially upon the holdings of Morrissey v. Brewer"5
and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.49 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court had held
that, while a parole revocation hearing was not a criminal proceeding
requiring the "full panoply" of rights due a criminal defendant,50 termina-
tion of the parolee's liberty would inflict a "grievous loss" upon the parolee
by removing him from employment, family and friends and returning him
to prison.51 Due process, therefore, required that the parolee be accorded
certain procedural safeguards, including the right to preliminary and final
hearings before an independent decisionmaker, 52 someone other than the
parolee's supervising officer, because "[t]he officer directly involved in
making recommendations cannot always have complete objectivity in
evaluating them." 53 In Gagnon, the Court had applied the procedural
safeguards developed in Morrissey to probation revocation hearings.54
In Withrow, the Supreme Court did not attempt to distinguish
Morrissey and Gagnon factually, but interpreted them to hold only that
when review of an initial decision is required, the reviewing decisionmaker
must not be the one who made the decision under review,55 a principle that
had been established by the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly.56
This interpretation of Morrissey and Gagnon is open to question in
that both cases emphasized the danger of bias where the parolee's or pro-
bationer's supervising officer could preside at the revocation hearings, 57
45. 330 U.S. at 237.
46. "We find no warrant for imposing upon administrative agencies a stiffer
rule [than is applied to judges], whereby examiners would be disentitled to sit be-
cause they ruled strongly against a party in the first hearing." Id. at 236-37.
47. 368 F. Supp. 796, 797-98 (E.D. Wis. 1973).
48. 408 US. 471 (1972).
49. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
50. 408 U.S. at 480.
51. Id. at 482.
52. Id. at 485-88.
53. Id. at 486.
54. 411 U.S. at 782.
55. 421 U.S. at 58 n.25.
56. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Concerning the requirements of due process in a
termination hearing under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program,
the Court stated: "[P]rior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily
bar a welfare official from acting as a decision maker. He should not, however, have
participated in making the determination under review." Id. at 271.
57. 408 U.S. at 485-86; 411 U.S. at 785. For a statement to the same effect, see
Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 198
(1974).
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situations very similar to that in Withrow.58 However, Morrissey and
Gagnon are distinguishable from Withrow in that the potential deprivation
of liberty involved in the former cases was of much greater severity than
in Withrow. A probation or parole revocation hearing is not strictly
speaking a criminal proceeding, but the parolee or probationer is entitled
to significant procedural safeguards because the result of an unfavorable
disposition of his case may be practically indistinguishable from a criminal
conviction.59
The Court also rejected Dr. Larkin's argument that its decision should
be controlled by In re Murchison,"° in which the Court ruled that a judge
authorized by state law to sit as a "one man grand jury" could not subse-
quently sit as judge in a criminal contempt trial concerning the acts of
the defendant at the "grand jury" investigation. 61 The Court had held in
Murchison that this procedure did not satisfy due process because it per-
nitted the judge to act as prosecutor and decisionmaker in the same case,
creating an unreasonable risk of bias against the defendant, 62 and because
the judge himself could not be cross-examined by the defendant concerning
the degree to which his decision in the contempt trial would be influenced
by what he had personally witnessed at the investigative hearing. 68 The
Court in Withrow did not agree that the Murchison rule necessarily pre-
cluded administrative agencies from investigating facts, instituting pro-
ceedings and adjudicating the issues, since the Court in Murchison had
called into question neither FTC v. Cement Institute," decided seven
years before, nor the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act which
permit certain combinations of investigative and adjudicative functions.65
58. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARv. L. REV. 49, 76-77 (1975).
59. Cf. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
60. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
61. Id. at 139.
62. Id. at 137.
63. Id. at 138-39.
64. 333 U.S. 683 (1948), discussed in text accompanying notes 41-44 supra.
65. 421 U.S. at 53. Congress recognized the need for some separation of func-
tions in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1970), which deals
with separation of functions, reads:
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case,
participate or advise in the decision, recommended decision, or agency review ...
except as witness or counsel in public proceedings. This subsection does not
apply-
(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency.
The exception set forth in subsection (C) has been interpreted to mean "agency
heads," or commissioners, 2 DAvIs, supra note 24, § 13.06, at 215, so that administrative
law judges and other agency employees, not being subject to the exception, are not
permitted both to investigate and adjudicate. In Amos Treat & Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d
260 (D.C. Cir. 1962), an agency employee who had been appointed a member of the
Commission was not allowed to participate in the decision of a case which he had
investigated prior to his appointment. For a discussion of Treat and its implications,
[VOL. 35
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It also pointed out that Dr. Larkin's counsel was permitted to attend the
Board's investigative hearing, 66 unlike the "grand jury" proceeding in
Murchison where counsel was not present. 67 The Court could also have
distinguished Murchison because it was a criminal case, thus calling for
more stringent procedural safeguards.68
The potential for prejudice exists whenever a decisionmaker has
had prior contact with the facts at issue in the cise before him. Due process
requires that a person under investigation by an administrative agency be
protected from unreasonable risk of bias in a subsequent quasi-judicial
proceeding, but a balance must be struck between the rights of the indi-
vidual and the public interest in promoting efficient administrative proce-
dures. 69 The decision in Withrow shows that the Supreme Court is un-
willing to create strict due process standards for administrative procedures,
although the Court made it clear that it will continue to invalidate specific
administrative decisions if an unconstitutional bias or risk of bias has
been shown.70 The value of the Court's decision in Withrow thus lies in
its shifting of the issue from whether a combination of functions is un-
constitutional to the more relevant question of whether the procedures in
question work in such a way as to deny due process. Further, by adopting
a strong presumption of constitutionality, the Court has again made clear
its position that the administrative adjudicatory process functions most
effectively when judicial interference in procedural matters is at a
minimum.
see Law, Disqualification of SEC Commissioners Appointed from the Staff: Amos
Treat, R.A. Holman, and the Threat to Expertise, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 257 (1964);
DAvIs, supra note 24, § 13.02, at 458-60 (Supp. 1970).
66. 421 U.S. at 54.
67. 349 U.S. at 135.
68. See note 34 and accompanying text supra. The Court did not decide in
Murchison that a judge should never preside over contempt charges instituted by
himself. The Court in Withrow indicated that subsequent cases have permitted
judges to do so. 421 U.S. at 53-54.
69. The Supreme Court enumerated three considerations in assessing what process
is due in a given context:
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976).
70. That the combination of investigative and adjudicatory functions does not,
without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude
a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the
case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.
421 U.S. at 58.
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ADMIRALTY - DIVISION OF PROPERTY DAMAGE - DAMAGES TO BE
DIVIDED AcCORDING TO PROPORTIONAL DEGREE OF FAULT IN BOTH-TO-
BLAME COLLISION CASES - United States v. Reliable Transfer Co.'
In December 1968 the coastal tanker Mary A. Whalen ended her
voyage from Constable Hook, New Jersey, to Island Park, New York,
stranded and damaged on a sand bar off Rockaway Point at the mouth of
New York harbor. The stranding occurred after the Mary A. Whalen's
captain attempted a U-turn in order to pass astern of a barge while ap-
proaching Rockaway Point. The captain, believing that the ship was farther
south than she actually was, proceeded through rough seas toward a
breakwater on which the Coast Guard normally maintained a light to warn
of the breakwater's presence. The captain had previously noted the absence
of the breakwater light. Upon sighting the breakwater lying directly in
his eastwardly course, he realized his navigational mistake and made a
hard turn into a sand bar.
The Reliable Transfer Company, which owned the Mary A. Whalen,
brought an action against the United States in federal district court 2 under
the Suits in Admiralty Act3 and the Federal Torts Claims Act 4 to recover
damages to the ship that were caused by the stranding. The district
court found the Coast Guard twenty-five percent at fault for failure to
maintain the breakwater light and found the Mary A. Whalen seventy-five
percent at fault for negotiating a hazardous and unnecessary turn in a
narrow and dangerous channel and then proceeding into the unknown
without first determining her position and direction. Instead of appor-
tioning the ships' damages according to the degree of fault of each party,
the district court divided the damages equally between the government
and the Reliable Transfer Company, relying upon the settled American
admiralty rule of divided damages. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. 5 The Supreme Court
1. 421 U.S. 397 (1975), noted in Healy & Koster, Reliable Transfer Co. v.
United States: Proportional Fault Rule, 7 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 293 (1975).
2. The memorandum opinion and order of the district court are unreported.
3. 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1970). Section 742 allows any appropriate non-jury
proceeding to be brought against the United States in an in personam capacity where
the same proceeding could have brought if the property owned or operated by the
United States were privately owned or operated.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970). Section 1346(b) provides that the federal district
courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States for
negligently caused injury or property loss due to the wrongful act or omission of any
government employee where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant.
5. Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036 (2d Cir. 1974). The
court of appeals first found that the district court's finding of mutual fault was not
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granted the government's petition for certiorari on the single issue of
whether the admiralty rule of divided damages should be replaced by a
rule of damages in proportion to fault,8 and held that
[w]hen two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause
property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such
damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the
comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is
to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or
when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of
their fault.7
In thus overturning the divided damages rule in mutual fault collision
and stranding cases, the Court reversed a United States admiralty doctrine
that dated back 121 years to The Catharine v. Dickinson.8 The rule of
divided damages operated to impose half the total property damages suf-
fered by both vessels in a mutual fault collision case on each vessel regardless
of the relative degree to which each vessel is at fault. As once stated
by the Supreme Court, "[i]t is undoubtedly the rule in admiralty that
where both vessels are in fault the sums representing the damage sustained
by each must be added together and the aggregate divided between the
two. This is in effect deducting the lesser from the greater and dividing
the remainder."9 This rule has generally been applied in cases where
damage was caused by a collision between two vessels, but it has also been
extended to cases of allision and grounding. 10
clearly erroneous, id. at 1037-38, so that its finding of fact had to stand. FED. R. Civ.
P. 52(a). The court of appeals rejected the government's contentions that its negli-
gence was a condition rather than a cause of the collision, and that the Mary A.
Whalen nevertheless had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. 497 F.2d at 1038.
The court also found the divided damages rule applicable to stranding cases, thus
allowing the lower court's equal division of damages to stand. Id.
6. 421 U.S. at 401 n.2.
7. Id. at 411. The Court vacated the judgment imposing liability on the United
States and remanded the case to allow damages against the United States propor-
tionate to its lesser degree of fault. Id. at 411.
8. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854).
9. The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51, 56 (1873); see also White Oak
Transp. Co. v. Boston, C.C. & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341 (1922); The Eugene F.
Moran, 212 U.S. 466 (1909); The North Star, 106 U.S. 17, 22 (1882).
10. See White Oak Transp. Co. v. Boston, C.C. & N.Y. Canal Co., 258 U.S. 341,
345 (1922) (canal company held liable for divided damages in the grounding of a
heavily overloaded vessel put through a canal before either the canal or the vessel
had been properly prepared); Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389, 394-95
(1874) (pier owner held liable for divided damages for the sinking of a barge which
had collided with his pier due to the barge operator's negligence where the pier had
been unlawfully placed in the river).
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The divided damages rule was first codified by the Laws of O16ron n
a medieval maritime codification. 12 The rule was initially applied to colli-
sions between ships under way and ships at anchor, possibly to deter the
clogging of harbors and channels by improperly moored ships.' 3 It was not
until the early nineteenth century and a dictum in The Woodrop-Sims,'4
however, that the rule emerged in English admiralty law as generally
applicable to all collision cases.15 In Hay v. LeNeve,16 the House of Lords
explicitly adopted the rule over the proportional damages rule in cases of
mutual fault collision.' 7 Thirty years later the rule was expressly adopted
in the United States by the Supreme Court in The Catharine.
Any assessment of the divided damages rule must take into account
those considerations which led the Supreme Court to adopt this rule in
The Catharine. The Court added the divided damages rule to American
admiralty law because it thought "the rule dividing the loss the most just
and equitable, and as best tending to induce care and vigilance on both
sides, in . . . navigation.'' i s This language expresses a twofold rationale
for the rule. First, by making each party liable for half the damages if
the fault of both parties contributed in any way to the collision, greater
care in maritime operations would be encouraged as even slight negligence
11. See Staring, Contribution and Division of Damages in Admiralty and Mari-
time Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Staring]. Staring
indicates that the Laws of Olron contained only the first maritime codification of the
divided damages rule; in all probability the rule itself extends back to Biblical times
in both maritime and non-maritime matters. Id. at 305-06.
12. "It is said that this code was promulgated, on the small island off the
French west coast from which it takes its name, by Eleanor of Aquitaine, on her
return from her spectacular course of misconduct in the Holy Land, and that it was
introduced into England by her son Richard the Lionhearted." G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, § 1-3, at 7 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as
GILMORE & BLACK].
13. See Staring, supra note 11, at 306-07 n.17. This deterrence aspect is sup-
ported by the fact that in order to invoke the divided damages rule, the master and
crew of a ship underway had merely to swear an oath that the accident was uninten-
tentional. Id. at 306. Clearly, the policy of the early divided damages rule was
heavily against those ships at anchor.
14. 2 Dods. 83, 165 Eng. Rep. 1422 (1815).
15. The court's formulation of the rule of damages where both parties are found
at fault did not make clear the manner in which damages were to be allocated:
A misfortune of this kind may arise where both parties are to blame; where
there has been a want- of due diligence or skill on both sides: in such a case, the
rule of law is that the loss must be apportioned between them, as having been
occasioned by the fault of both of them.
Id. at 1423. In the end, however, the court did not apply this rule, as it found one
party to the collision solely at fault.
16. 4 Scots Rev. R. 406 (1824).
17. The divided damages rule as announced by The Woodrop-Sims and Hay v-
LeNeve remained the law in England until the passage of the Maritime Conven-
tions Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Gdo. 5, c. 57, established the comparative negligence rule
in England.
18. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170, 178 (1854).
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could result in severe liability.19 In other words, this rule would sup-
posedly discourage vessel operators from deviating even slightly from a
reasonable standard of care in operating their ships. Such scrupulous care
would, of course, tend to increase safety in maritime operations by resulting
in a reduction in the number of collisions. The second prong of the
Court's rationale derives from its reference to the divided damages rule
as "just and equitable." By applying the divided damages rule, the Court
in The Catharine was attempting to mitigate the harshness of the doctrine
of contributory negligence which, at common law, provided a complete
defense to a negligent defendant when the plaintiff's negligence contributed
to his own injury in any degree.2 0 The divided damages rule thus made
its debut in American admiralty law in order to promote greater care in
the operation of ships and to give negligent plaintiffs an escape from the
harshness of the common law doctrine of contributory negligence.
Subsequent to The Catharine, the Supreme Court expressly relied upon
the divided damages rule in deciding several cases, 2' but prior to Reliable
19. For an example of judicial understanding of the deterrent nature of The
Catharine's rationale, see 421 U.S. at 405 n.11; cf. Note, The Pennsylvania Rule:
Charting a New Course for An Ancient Mariner, 54 B.U.L. REv. 78, 81-82 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Note, The Pennsylvania Rule], where -he deterrent effect of the
rule of The Catharine is compared with that of the Pennsylvania Rule. See text
accompanying notes 39-53 infra. For support of the position that the divided damages
rule has no more deterrent effect than the rule of Comparative or proportional fault,
see 421 U.S. at 405 n.11. Indeed, in regard to grossly negligent vessels, it is arguable
that the divided damages rule has little or no deterrerqt effect because there is no
greater liability for being grossly at fault than there is for being but slightly at fault.
20. See generally GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 12, at 7-20; Mole & Wilson,
A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CORNELL L.Q. 333 (1932). With respect to
this rationale, it is curious that the Supreme Court felt compelled to go only so far
as equal division of damages in order to avoid the injustice of the contributory negli-
gence doctrine. It has long been an established doctrine in admiralty that contributory
negligence did not bar recovery on personal injury claims; a contributorily negligent
plaintiff merely suffered a reduction in recovery according.to the degree to which his
fault contributed to his injury. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305
U.S. 424 (1939); The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing
Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954); Hudson v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 263 F. 730
(W.D. Pa. 1911). That the Court did not.choose to adopt the comparative fault rule
in collision and stranding cases prior to Reliable Transfer has been explained in
numerous ways, ranging from the protection of cargo, interests from possibly severe
consequences as a result of combining the comparative fault rule with statutory exemp-
tions for carriers from certain suits by cargo owners, see Emmett, Collision Liability -
Some Considerations and Consequences, 35 TUL. L.. REv. 75 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Emmett]; Staring, supra note 11; Huger, The Proportional Damage Rule
in Collision at Sea, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 531 (1928) [hereinafter cited as Huger], to
the unlikely possibility that appellate courts are just not sufficiently aware of the
injustice done by the divided damages rule as they usually are not confronted with
actual damage figures on appeal, see Jackson, The Archaic Rule of Dividing Damages
in Marine Collisions, 19 ALA. L. REv. 263 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Jackson].
21. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597 (1963);
Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Moller, 320 U.S. 462 (1943); The North Star, 106 U.S. 17
(1882) ; The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876) ; The Sapphire, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 51 (1873).
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Transfer there had been no serious reconsideration by the Court of the
desirability of the rule. The lower courts, however, expressed a considerable
degree of discontent with the rule due to some commonly perceived in-
equities involved in its application.2 2 Perhaps the most strenuous objection
to the rule has been that it is often "plainly unjust" in result when com-
pared with a rule allowing apportionment of damages on the basis of
comparative degrees of fault. 23 The following paradigm, suggested by
several commentators,24 illustrates this problem with greater clarity: Ship
A and Ship B have collided in navigable waters, resulting in combined
damages of $100,000. The trial court finds both vessels at fault, but it is
determined that A's fault contributed seventy-five percent toward causing
the collision, while B's fault contributed only twenty-five percent. Further-
more, it is found that Ship B has suffered $20,000 damages while Ship A
has suffered $80,000 damages. Under the divided damages rule, each ship
would be liable for $50,000, regardless of the degree of her fault. The result
would be that A would' recover $30,000 from B in order to make A
"whole," that is, so that A would have to bear a total loss of $50,000 rather
than $80,000. Under the proportional damages rule, however, each ship
would only be liable for that proportion of the total damages represented
by her comparative degree of contributing fault. Thus B would be liable
for twenty-five percent of the total loss, or $25,000, while A would be
liable for seventy-five percent of the total, or $75,000. Under the propor-
tional damages rule, A would recover only $5,000 from B; her recovery
thus would be tailored to the degree to which each ship's fault actually
contributed to bringing about the loss.
The divided damages rule can cause severe hardship, as the above
example serves to show. The reaction in the lower courts has ranged from
application of the rule under protest 25 to an outright refusal by some courts
to apply the law of The Catharine.26 In this latter regard, N.M. Patterson
22. See, e.g., N.M. Patterson & Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago, 324 F.2d 254
(7th Cir. 1963); Dwyer Oil Transp., Inc. v. The Edna Matton, 255 F.2d 380 (2d
Cir. 1958); In re Adams, 237 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1956); In re Diesel Tanker A.C.
Dodge, Inc., 234 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1956); Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing Co., 214
F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 157 F.2d 250
(2d Cir. 1946).
23. For full expression of this objection to the divided damages rule, see Judge
Learned Hand's dissent in National Bulk Carrier, Inc. v. United States, 183 F.2d 405,
410 (2d Cir. 1950).
24. See, e.g., Emmett, supra note 20; Huger, supra note 20.
25. See Tank Barge Hygrade, Inc. v. The Gatco N.J., 250 F.2d 485 (3d Cir.
1958); Marine Fuel Transfer Corp. v. The Ruth, 231 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1956);
Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
26. Actions of the latter sort have been largely restricted to the district courts,
see, The Margaret, 30 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1928) (Third Circuit applied comparative
fault rule where one vessel created the hazardous situation to which the other vessel
reacted negligently; the court recanted in a per curiam opinion, 30 F.2d at 928, and
applied the divided damages rule so as not to violate the law of The Catharine) ; The
No. 6H. 108 F. 29 (E.D.N.Y. 1901) (negligent failure to moor scows was found to con-
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& Sons, Ltd. v. City of Chicago27 noted that the Supreme Court had only
applied the divided damages rule where the mutual fault of the parties was
almost equal. Although the case was reversed on appeal, the district court's
reasoning, vindicated in Reliable Transfer, suggests that had the Supreme
Court been confronted in The Catharine with a case of grossly dispropor-
tionate fault, it would have opted for a proportional damages rule.28 What-
ever the possible interpretation of the spirit of The Catharine, the lower
federal courts have nevertheless consistently interpreted its law to be that
equal division of damages was mandatory once mutual, contributing fault
had been established.29 In short, prior to Reliable Transfer the divided
damages rule had become a mechanically applied formula that was retained
through the inertia of stare decisis even though its rationale was widely
disfavored.
The divided damages rule was limited somewhat in its application to
disproportionate fault situations by judicially created presumptions. Chief
among these was the presumption, advanced by the Supreme Court in
The Great Republic0 and The City of New York,3 1 that once one party's
fault was established and shown to be sufficient in itself to have caused the
collision and ensuing damages, the Court would resolve all reasonable doubts
concerning the contributing fault of the other party in that party's favor.3 2
tribute only one-third of the total damage; damages were therefore apportioned accord-
ing to that degree of fault) ; The Mary Ida, 20 F. 741, 747 (S.D. Ala. 1884) (vessel
whose only fault was not reacting quickly enough to the danger created by another
vessel held liable for one-fourth the total damages). Such judicial outlawry has been
rather infrequent, however, as most courts have been content to apply the divided
damages rule while hoping for change from either the Supreme Court or Congress.
See Reliable Transfer Co. v. United States, 497 F.2d 1036, 1038 (2d Cir. 1974).
27. 209 F. Supp. 576, 588-91 (N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd 324 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1963)
(circuit court followed precedent of The Catharine).
28. For a discussion of this possibility see Jackson, supra note 20, at 266-67. Both
Jackson and the district court in Patterson rely heavily upon the flexibility of admiralty
courts in arguing for a different outcome if the fault had been disproportionate.
29. This view of The Catharine was supported by The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302 (1876),
where the Supreme Court stated:
Cases . . . arise where both vessels are in fault; and the repeated decisions of
this court have established the rule, that in that contingency the damages shall be
equally apportioned between the offending vessels, as having been occasioned by
the fault of both.
Id. at 319. See also Davis, Divided Damages - The Albatross of the Modern Mariner,
7 ST. MARY's L.J. 258, 263 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Davis].
30. 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 20, 34-35 (1874).
31. 147 U.S. 72 (1893).
32. As stated by the Court in The City of Ncw York:
Where fault on the part of one vessel is established by uncontradicted testimony,
and such fault is, of itself, sufficient to account for the disaster, it is not enough
for such vessel to raise a doubt with regard to the management of the other vessel.
There is some presumption at least adverse to its claim, and any reasonable doubt
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This presumption, referred to as the major/minor fault "rule," operated
to shield parties that were only slightly at fault from the harshness of the
divided damages rule. This was accomplished by placing upon the party
shown to be primarily at fault an unusually heavy burden of proving by
clear and convincing evidence that the slight fault of the other party was a
contributing cause of the collision.33 Only after such a showing could the
divided damages rule be applied. Thus a plaintiff only slightly at fault
could recover the full amount of its loss if it could show that the defendant's
fault was sufficient in and of itself to have caused the collision, and the
defendant was then unable to demonstrate clearly that the plaintiff's fault
had also contributed to the collision.
The problem most frequently noted with respect to the major/minor
fault "rule" was that it was not really a rule at all, but merely a presumption.
Its application was entirely within the discretion of the court, and the
presumption generally arose only when the court was convinced that the
fault was greatly disproportionate. 34 The result was that the "protection"
offered by the "rule" was inherently unreliable, allowing different outcomes
in different courts on almost identical facts. 35 Additionally, it was suggested
by some courts that the "rule" merely served to substitute one unfairness
for another. 36 That one party's fault is the primary cause of a collision does
not mean that it should bear the total loss when there are other parties
who have also contributed to the loss. An inequitable result becomes more
probable if the court uses an oppressive standard of proof such as that
required by the major/minor fault doctrine because the vessel primarily at
fault is unlikely to sustain its abnormally heavy burden. Thus under this
presumption, one vessel would often have to absorb all the damages without
being wholly at fault. The dilemma created by the attempt to mitigate the
unfairness of the divided damages rule by the major/minor fault exception
with regard to the propriety of the conduct of such other vessel should be resolved
in its favor.
Id. at 85 (emphasis supplied).
33. The language in The City of New York describing this burden appears to
establish a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See passage quoted at note 32
supra. However, two subsequent Supreme Court cases cast doubt upon this interpreta-
tion. See The Victory, 168 U.S. 410, 423 (1897) (proof of contributing cause of
"minor" party to be by "clear and convincing" evidence) ; The Oregon, 158 U.S. 186,
204 (1895) (proof of "minor" party's fault to be by "clear" evidence). Notwith-
standing this doubt, these cases clearly indicate that the burden of proof required of
the party grossly at fault is considerably heavier than that of the normal preponder-
ance of the evidence standard.
34. See, e.g., GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 12, § 7-4, at 492-93; Davis, supra
note 29, at 263; Staring, supra note 11, at 341 n.242.
35. See authorities cited at note 34 supra.
36. See Tank Barge Hygrade, Inc. v. The Gatco N.J., 250 F.2d 485 (3d Cir.
1958), and authorities cited therein at 487.
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was best expressed in Judge Learned Hand's dissent in National Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. United States :3
[T] he doctrine that a court should not look too jealously at the naviga-
tion of one vessel, when the faults of the other are glaring, is in the
nature of a sop to Cerebus. It is no doubt better than nothing; but
it is inadequate to reach the heart of the matter, and constitutes a
constant temptation to courts to avoid a decision on the merits.
The major/minor fault "rule" developed to lessen the hardship im-
posed by the divided damages rule in cases of widely disproportionate fault
by allowing the court, in effect, to disregard what might have been con-
strued as fault in other circumstances.38 Where the slight or technical fault
of one vessel is of a particular nature, however, the Supreme Court has
denied access to the softening effect of the major/minor fault doctrine. In
The Pennsylvania,39 the Court propounded a presumption that a violation
by one of the vessels involved in a collision of statutes or regulations de-
signed to prevent collisions is prima facie evidence that the violation was
a contributing cause of the accident.
The first thing to note about the Pennsylvania Rule is its operation
vis-a-vis the general tort law doctrine of negligence per se.4 0 Under the
negligence per se doctrine, the party wishing to establish tort liability on
the basis of a statutory violation must show (a) that the opposing party
in fact violated the statute in question; (b) that the statute was designed
to prevent the type of loss suffered; and, (c) that the injured party is a
member of the class of persons that the statute was designed to protect.41
Once the injured party has established these requisites, he must also show
that the opposing party's statutory violation proximately caused the injury.'2
The rule of The Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has the effect of shifting
the burden of proof as to contributing cause from the injured party to
the statutory violator once the injured party has proved the three elements
of statutory violation, protection by the statute of the injured party from
the loss suffered, and legislative design to prevent collision. 43 It thus falls
to the statutory violator to exonerate himself by showing not that "[his]
fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it probably was not,
but that it could not have been" a cause of the loss.4 4 The result is that
the Pennsylvania Rule operates very much like a penalty against a statutory
37. 183 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1950).
38. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 12, § 7-4, at 492.
39. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873).
40. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as
PROSSER].
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286-88 (1965).
42. Id.
43. See Note, The Pennsylvania Rule, supra note 19, at 79 n.9.
44. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136 (emphasis supplied).
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violator,45 in that the violator must not only produce evidence to rebut
the inference of causation, but must also persuade the finder of fact beyond
all doubt that this violation did not contribute to the collision.46
The rationale of the Pennsylvania Rule is quite clear:
[W]hen, as in this case, a ship at the time of a collision is in actual
violation of a statutory rule intended to prevent collisions, it is no
more than a reasonable presumption that the fault, if not the sole
cause, was at least a contributory cause of the disaster . . . .Such a
rule is necessary to enforce obedience to the mandate of the statute.4 7
The Supreme Court advanced the rule of The Pennsylvania to encourage
strict compliance with those statutes designed to prevent collisions, thereby
increasing safety. Most cases invoking the Pennsylvania Rule have con-
cerned violations of one of the four sets of statutory navigational rules, 8
but other statutes also come within the ambit of the Pennsylvania Rule.' 9
Although it has been suggested that the Pennsylvania Rule was promul-
gated in order more fully to effect the deterrent aspect of the divided
damages rule,50 it is arguable that the rationales of these two rules are
not interdependent. 51 Nevertheless, in its application, the divided damages
rule does have a decided impact upon the Pennsylvania Rule. Despite its
laudable policy, the Pennsylvania Rule has resulted in severe hardship for
some violators primarily because the divided damages rule was automati-
cally triggered once a vessel's fault was established by showing a violation
of a navigational rule.52
45. See The Princess Sophia, 61 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1932) (Pennsylvania
Rule held a penalty for violation of American equipping and manning statute).
46. Some courts have lessened this burden to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Note, The Pennsylvania Rule, supra note 19, at 80.
47. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 136 (emphasis supplied).
48. These rules consist of the International Rules of Navigation, 33 U.S.C. §§
1051-94 (1970); the Great Lakes Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 241-95 (1970); the Western
Rivers Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§ 301-56 (1970) ; and the Inland Rules, 33 U.S.C. §§
151-232 (1970). Together these rules form the Rules of the Road and are fully
discussed in GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 12, §§ 7-3 and 7-7 through 7-13.
49. These include federal, state, and local enactments, as well as proved local
customs and regulations not inconsistent with the Rules of the Road. See GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 12, §§ 7-3, 7-13.
50. Note, The Pennsylvania Rule, supra note 19, at 81-82.
51. The Supreme Court in Reliable Transfer suggests that the deterrence theory
of the rule of divided damages found in The Catharine is so unpersuasive as not to
have been seriously intended by the Court. 421 U.S. at 405 n.11.
52. See The Martello, 153 U.S. 64 (1894). In determining the threshold ques-
tion of fault, the Pennsylvania Rule includes even technical violations of a minor
nature. The severe hardship of the Rule is illustrated by The Martello, where the
ship Freda A. Willey was found liable for failing to use a mechanical foghorn even
though she had sounded a non-mechanical foghorn at the statutorily prescribed inter-
vals and that foghorn had been heard by the plaintiff in time to avoid collision. The
Court found the failure to sound a mechanical foghorn, as required by the then cur-
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Primarily because of these hardships, the circuit courts of appeals
have been sharply divided upon the strictness with which the Pennsylvania
Rule should be applied. 53 The Fourth Circuit has been especially innovative
in circumventing the Pennsylvania Rule by utilizing such disfavored tort
doctrines as "passive action" and "last clear chance." 54 In addition many
circuits have been more willing to find the burden imposed on the statutory
violator by the Pennsylvania Rule satisfied when the non-violator's fault
has been disproportionately greater than the violator's, 55 indicating a re-
luctance to unfairly impose the divided damages rule.
The net result of these legal developments prior to Reliable Transfer
was a high degree of uncertainty as to the actual state of the law. Clearly,
the divided damages rule applied to allocate evenly the losses due to a
mutual fault collision or stranding, but the availability of judicial presump-
tions having the effect of magnifying or diminishing the applicability of
that rule made its application rather uncertain as not all courts had applied
these presumptions in the same manner.
The immediate result of Reliable Transfer was to declare the rule of
proportional damages the governing law in mutual fault collisions and
strandings.58 This has the obvious effect of overturning the divided dam-
ages rule, as the two rules are inconsistent with one another. While the
major/minor fault presumption did not expressly depend upon the divided
damages rule for its existence, it is difficult to conceive of its having any
utility in a world dominated by a rule of proportional fault. The major/
minor fault doctrine allowed a court to close its eyes to "minor" contributing
fault to relieve a slightly liable party from half liability. The rule of propor-
tional or comparative fault renders this charade unnecessary because the
rent International Rules, to be a violation which causally contributed to the collision.
Once fault was determined by application of the Pennsylvania Rule, the divided
damages rules then operated to allocate the loss to which that fault contributed.
53. In Diesel Tanker F.A. Verdon, Inc. v. Stakeboat No. 2, 340 F.2d 465 (2d
Cir. 1965), the court did not allow any margin for application of the major/minor
fault rule when any appropriate statutory violation was shown to be present. In
contrast the Fourth Circuit applied the major/minor fault rule even where one
vessel had violated one of the Rules of the Road, because the other vessel's action was
so foolhardy that the danger it created could neither have been anticipated nor
avoided; failure to blow a danger whistle, although required by the Rules, could not
have contributed to the collision. See Webb v. Davis, 236 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1956).
The difference in result appears to be that the Fourth Circuit has emphasized the
safety rationale in applying the Pennsylvania Rule, while the Second Circuit has
taken a more mechanistic approach.
54. See, e.g., Tempest v. United States, 404 F.2d 870, 872 (4th Cir. 1968) (if
statutory violation means no more than that, but for the violation, the violating
vessel would not have been where she was, then her fault did not actively contribute
to the collision and the Pennsylvania Rule was held not to apply even though there was
in fact a statutory violation).
55. See cases cited by GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 12, § 7-5.
56. 421 U.S. at 411.
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rule of proportional damages tailors liability to degree of fault. Further,
the proportional fault rule eliminates the inherent unfairness of the major/
minor fault "rule" because it does not completely exonerate a "minor" party
from all liability. Thus the "major" party need no longer bear the total
loss as he would have under the major/minor fault presumption. Thus,
it would appear that as a result of Reliable Transfer, neither the divided
damages rule nor the major/minor fault "rule" will have any future appli-
cability.
In contrast, the Pennsylvania Rule, although somewhat lessened in its
deterrent force, clearly survives the Reliable Transfer decision. The basic
reason for this is that the Pennsylvania Rule was designed primarily to
increase the likelihood that a certain class of violators would be held liable
in damages for statutory violations. The obvious effect of a rule requiring
statutory violators to exonerate themselves from liability by showing beyond
a reasonable doubt 57 that their violations did not contribute to injuries is to
promote more diligent observance of the type of statutes in question. This
is clearly what the Court in The Pennsylvania intended to accomplish,
and it is equally clear that the Court was not fashioning a rule to allocate
damages. This does not mean that the Pennsylvania Rule was unaffected
in its operation by the divided damages rule. In fact, due to the almost
automatic and mechanistic application of the divided damages rule by the
lower courts once mutual fault was established in collision cases, 5s the
Pennsylvania Rule took on a magnified deterrent effect. Because the
Pennsylvania Rule made the finding of a statutory violator's liability
more likely due to the heavy burden imposed on the violator, the divided
damages rule made it almost certain that a statutory violator of this sort
would be liable for half the total damages, even if the violation were only
minor. After Reliable Transfer, however, statutory violators are no longer
threatened with automatic half damages if they are unable to exonerate
themselves from liability. Because this threat has been removed by Reliable
Transfer, the deterrent effect of the Pennsylvania Rule, to the extent it was
magnified by the old rule, is diminished.
The immediate effect of Reliable Transfer, besides replacing the
divided damages rule with a rule of proportional fault, has been to sweep
away many of the traditional doctrines that previously had been employed
in an effort to mitigate the harshness of the divided damages rule. At the
same time the Court has preserved the Pennsylvania Rule, even though
that doctrine had distinct interactions with the former rule of divided
damages. Because there were fundamentally different principles underlying
the two rules, the demise of The Catharine must not be seen as destroying
the rule of The Pennsylvania.
57. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
58. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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ANTITRUST LAW - TYING ARRANGEMENTS - TYING PRODUCT
UNIQUENESS COUPLED WITH HIGHER THAN COMPETITIVE PRICE FOR
THE TIED PRODUCT AND SUBSTANTIAL VOLUME OF BUSINESS IN THE
TIED PRODUCT HELD TO ESTABLISH THE MARKET POWER PREREQUISITE
TO APPLICATION OF THE PER SE RULE - Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp.1
In an attempt to enter the prefabricated housing market, United States
Steel Corporation established a financing subsidiary, U. S. Steel Homes
Credit Corporation, which offered unusually liberal credit terms to cus-
tomers agreeing to purchase the parent corporation's homes.2 Fortner
Enterprises accepted a loan but tried to rescind its agreement to purchase
Steel's houses when they proved defective and difficult to sell.3 The
company eventually defaulted on the loan and Credit foreclosed. Fortner
sued Steel and Credit for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act 4 by im-
posing an illegal tying arrangement upon it.5 Five court decisions over
1. 523 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3461 (Feb. 24, 1976).
2. The liberal terms offered by Credit covered not only the cost of the homes
but included an additional sum for land acquisition and development.
3. Fortner proposed that Credit continue to finance its development but that it
be free to build conventional homes procured from another seller. Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., Civil No. 4392 (W.D. Ky., filed Aug. 13, 1974),
Finding of Fact Number 19. Fortner therefore wanted Credit, whose only business
was to finance the sale of its parent company's prefabricated houses, to extend its
liberal credit terms to finance conventional construction. The credit obtained by
Fortner was in fact more favorable than Credit usually offered. Fortner's own
initiative induced Credit to lend one hundred percent of the land acquisition and
development costs as opposed to the usual sixty percent. See Dam, Fortner Enter-
prises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower, Nor a Lender Be," 1969 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 5-7.
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1973).
5. A tying arrangement exists when a seller or lessor requires a customer to
purchase or lease a product he may or may not need in order to get the product he
wants. When both products are "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or
other commodities" these tying arrangements are considered illegal per se (i.e., there
need be no proof of actual harm) under section three of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1970). E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(lessees of patented salt dispensing machines required to buy salt from the lessor) ;
IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936) (tabulating machine cards tied
to the machines). Where one of the products, here credit, is not a "goo [d] . . . or
other commodit[y]" under the Clayton Act, the arrangement may be condemned only
if it violates the Sherman Act. See United States v. Investors Diversified Services,
Inc., 102 F. Supp. 645 (D. Minn. 1951). See also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500 (1969); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953)
(advertising space in the only morning paper tied to space, in one of two competing
evening papers). Under the Sherman Act, tying arrangements are illegal per se if
the seller has sufficient economic power in the market for the tying product to restrain
(725)
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a period of ten years, including a controversial decision by the Supreme
Court, 6 narrowed the issues in the case to one: whether the defendants
have sufficient power in the credit market to make the tying arrangement
illegal per se.7 The district court found that Credit had sufficient market
power by inferring power over the tying product (credit) from the unique-
ness of the credit terms, the large volume of business in the tied product
(prefabricated homes), the appreciable number of purchasers of the tied
product and the higher-than-competitive price for the tied product., The
Sixth Circuit upheld this finding and affirmed the judgment of the district
free competition in the market for the tied product and if a not insubstantial (not
de minimis) amount of interstate commerce is affected. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). The claim in Fortner was that Credit refused to sell
its product, credit, unless Fortner also brought the houses. For further discussion
and analysis of tie-ins in general and of this tie-in in particular, see Dam, supra note 3.
6. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
Fortner instituted its antitrust action in 1962. The district court granted Steel's
motion for summary judgment on the theory that credit was not a separate product
for purposes of a tie. 293 F. Supp. 762 (W.D. Ky. 1966). The court of appeals
affirmed in a per curiam opinion. 404 F.2d 936 (6th Cir. 1968). The Supreme Court
then reversed and remanded the case for trial holding specifically that credit could be
a separate product for tying purposes. 394 U.S. at 507. The district court then, in an
unreported opinion, directed a verdict in favor of Fortner on the existence of an
illegal tying arrangement. The jury found damages of $93,200 which the court trebled
in accordance with the provisions of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The
court of appeals reversed the judgment directing a verdict for Fortner and remanded
for further trial on the sufficiency of Credit's market power. 452 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972). The parties then agreed to hold a special
proceeding in the district court, without jury, limited to the issue of whether Credit
had sufficient market power to bring the per se rule into play. In the instant decision,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment for Fortner.
The Supreme Court decision in Fortner has engendered much controversy.
Its finding of two products, by a five to four decision, surprised and dismayed prac-
tioners and led to speculation that the Court's rule would be narrowly limited to the
situation where a giant corporation invades a market made up of relatively small
competitors. Fortner has been described as a one-case decision arising from the
Court's fear that by virtue of Steel's size and resources it would overpower and
destroy competition. Nelson, Tying Arrangements Reconsidered: A Review of Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 7, 30-31 (1970).
7. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Sherman Act to prohibit only con-
tracts that "unreasonably" restrain competition. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1912). However, the Court has also held:
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Tying arrangements are
unreasonable in and of themselves and therefore are per se illegal "[w]henever a party
has sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not insubstantial'
amount of interstate commerce is affected." Id. at 6.
8. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., Civil No. 4392 (W.D.
Ky., filed Aug. 13, 1974), Conclusion of Law Number 3.
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court which held the defendants liable for treble the profits lost due to
Credit's foreclosure upon Fortner's default."
The court of appeals first upheld as not clearly erroneous the dis-
trict court's finding of unique credit terms.10 It then had to consider the
consequences of this finding. The Supreme Court in Fortner had spoken
of uniqueness coupled with a legal, physical, or economic barrier preventing
competitors from offering an identical product as proof of market power.1
No such barrier was found by the district court.'2 The court of appeals
stated, however, that since
the evidence offered by plaintiff to show economic power is not
limited to the loan's uniqueness, the trial court was free to evaluate
the other evidence along with the evidence of economic power derived
from uniqueness in determining that defendants had sufficient eco-
nomic power in the credit market appreciably to restrain free competi-
tion for prefabricated houses. Other evidence indicated that there was
9. 523 F.2d at 963. There is no official indication how the jury arrived at its
findings of damages. Counsel for United States Steel reports that the high price
of the houses was not the basis of the damages awarded; rather, it was the profits
lost due to the failure of the project and Credit's foreclosure. Because the amount
awarded was considerably less than it could have been, Steel did not appeal any of
the damage aspects of the trial. Telephone conversation with Albert F. Reutlinger,
Esq., of Louisville, Kentucky, on November 25, 1975. See notes 28-34 and accom-
panying text infra.
10. 523 F.2d at 964. The court considered two other arguments Steel raised.
The first was that there had been no market foreclosure and therefore section one
of the Sherman Act could not have been violated. The court recognized that recent
cases have suggested the need for an actual foreclosure to establish an illegal tie,
see Coniglio v. Highwood Service, Inc., 495 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1022 (1974); Grossman Dev. Co. v. Detroit Lions, Inc., 1973-2 Trade Cas.
74,790 (E.D. Mich. 1973), aff'd without opinion, 503 F.2d 1404 (6th Cir. 1974),
but then said, "the thrust of the total testimony clearly shows that someone . . .
would have bought the homes of competitors of U.S. Steel if no similar credit had
been offered, and thus that some competition was foreclosed." 523 F.2d at 967. See
text accompanying notes 38-39 infra.
Steel also questioned the finding that the one hundred percent financing was
unique. The Sixth Circuit ruled the district court's finding in this respect was not
clearly erroneous. In so doing it did not ask what was the relevant geographic
market for determining uniqueness, a crucial factor where, as here, market power
largely depends on uniqueness. Trial testimony appeared limited to the Louisville
area and the district court may have decided that the correct market was Louisville,
but this is not at all clear. The Sixth Circuit called the loan "unique at that time in
the Louisville area . . . ." 523 F2d at 964. It is not certain that this was the correct
geographic market; in today's economy it is usually possible to borrow away from
home. Defining the market without analysis is questionable methodology, and, poten-
tially a source of injustice.
An additional problem with the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the finding of
uniqueness is the court's conclusory limitation of its inquiry to the time Credit made
its loan to Fortner. After the loans were made other institutions in the Louisville
area began offering one hundred percent loans. Dam, supra note 3, at 24.
11. 394 U.S. at 505 n.2.
12. 523 F2d at 966. See text accompanying notes 27-30 infra.
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a substantial volume of business involving the tied product, that an
appreciable number of customers accepted the tied product, and that
the Homes Division houses cost $455 more than comparable homes.' 3
The court of appeals thus attempted to remedy "the district court's failure
to find the factors suggested by the Supreme Court which would [have]
allow[ed] uniqueness to be relied upon as the only source of economic
power"'14 by concluding. that the "plaintiff presented other evidence from
which the requisite economic power or leverage could properly be in-
ferred."' 5 Thus, product uniqueness was supplemented by a finding of
high business volume and a finding of higher-than-competitive price for
the tied product in order to establish the necessary leverage in the credit
market.
The two prerequisites for applying the per se illegality rule in tying
cases brought under the Sherman Act - economic power in the tying
product market and effect on a not insubstantial amount of commerce' 6 -
may have been altered inadvertently by the court of appeals. The Supreme
Court had already found that a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate
commerce had been affected by the tying arrangement in this case. 17 On
remand the lower courts had only to consider the first requirement, de-
fendant's power in the tying market. Use by the lower courts of the
evidence of volume of business in the tied product - the very evidence
upon which the Supreme Court had based its determination that the
second prerequisite had been met - tends to collapse the distinction
between the prerequisites. Moreover, because a "not insubstantial" volume
of business must appear in all cases to satisfy the second prerequisite, the
court of appeals appears to hold that findings of tying product uniqueness
13. 523 F.2d at 966.
14. Id. at 967.
15. Id.
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). See notes 5 & 7
supra.
17. The Court said:
For purposes of determining whether the amount of commerce foreclosed is too
insubstantial to warrant prohibition of the practice, therefore, the relevant figure
is the total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge, not the por-
tion of this total accounted for by the particular plaintiff who brings suit ....
In the present case, the. annual sales allegedly foreclosed by respondents' tying
arrangements throughout the country totalled almost $4,000,000 in 1960, more
than $2,800,000 in 1961, .and almost $2,300,000 in 1962. These amounts could
scarcely be regarded as insubstantial.
394 U.S. at 502.
No additional evidence regarding substantiality of the amount of commerce
foreclosed was introduced at the special proceeding in the district court, and so,
following the Sixth Circuit's instructions, 452 F.2d at 1100, the district court con-
cluded that the amount of commerce involved was substantial. Fortner Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., Civil No. 4392 (W.D. Ky., filed Aug. 13, 1974),
Finding of Fact Number 22; Conclusion of Law Number 1. In affirming, the court
of appeals merely quoted the Supreme Court to show the amount was not insubstantial.
452 F.2d at 1100.
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plus a non-competitive higher price for the tied product justify a finding
of market power over the tying product. Alternatively, the court of appeals
may have differentiated between the "not insubstantial" amount of inter-
state commerce which is a separate prerequisite to application of the per
se rule' and some larger volume of business which constitutes independent
proof of the market power prerequisite to application of the per se rule.
It is difficult to conclude that the court relied on price differential
alone to supplement uniqueness and establish market power because the
court's discussion of the evidence presented on the price issue was cursory.
In the district court the only evidence of price differential was the testi-
mony of Fortner's construction supervisor. He testified that he had com-
pared the price of United States Steel's prefabricated houses with the
costs of materials and of assembly for a comparable "conventional house."'19
The Court did not consider whether the witness compared two different
products: prefabricated houses and conventional houses. Such an im-
portant question demands some attention, yet the trial court ignored it.
The Sixth Circuit in summarizing the evidence noted that "the Homes
Division houses cost $455 more than comparable homes,"20 thus over-
looking entirely the prefabricated/conventional distinction. If the court
was in fact basing its finding of market power solely on uniqueness and
higher price, then its cursory treatment of the price differential issue is
objectionable.21
When evidence of volume enters the market power equation another
problem arises entirely apart from the confusion over whether the court
was differentiating between a "not insubstantial" amount of business -
the second prerequisite - and a larger than "not insubstantial" amount
which constitutes evidence of market power.22 In its discussion of market
power, the Supreme Court had said that, when power exists, buyers
can be forced to accept the higher price .... Accordingly, the proper
focus of concern is whether the seller has the power to raise prices,
18. 394 U.S. at 501.
19. Finding of Fact Number 43 reads in part:
Plaintiff called as a witness at the 1970 trial Mr. Herman Miles. Mr. Miles and
his company were the supervisors of the construction at the plaintiff's project in
question .... Mr. Miles [from his vast experience] testified as to a comparison
which he had made of the prefabricated house package of the Homes Division
with the cost of materials and assembly of a conventional house comparable to
the Homes Division house package and found that the United States Steel house
package was priced $455.00 more than comparable components at the same
point in a conventional home.
Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., Civil No. 4392 (W.D. Ky.,
filed Aug. 13, 1974).
20. 523 F.2d at 966.
21. The dissenting justices of the Supreme Court argued that a single package
involving credit and houses was involved and that it was unfair to look at the price
of one component and not another in a cost comparison.' See 394 U.S. at 522 (Fortas,
J., dissenting).
22. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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or impose other burdensome terms such as a tie-in, with respect to
any appreciable number of buyers within the market. 23
The court of appeals interpreted the last part of this statement to mean
that the number of customers accepting the tie-in is one factor evidencing
market power. However, this reference to number of customers should
be read only to refer to the other prerequisite for use of the per se rule,
a not insubstantial volume of business. The Supreme Court condemned
forcing a buyer to accept a tie-in.2 4 Power to force this acceptance is the
market power prerequisite. The number of buyers accepting a tie-in and
the volume of business tied are not probative of market power in and of
themselves. In a particular economic situation, volume may be related
to power ;25 however, since this is by no means a necessary correlation,
further analysis of the situation is necessary to establish the probative
value of the evidence. Neither the court of appeals nor the district court
analyzed the significance of volume in this case, merely concluding that
because many customers accepted Credit's terms Credit must have had
market power. By recycling the evidence of one prerequisite into its
consideration of the other, and by failing to demonstrate the relevance of
the evidence of volume to market power, the Sixth Circuit undermined
the bipartite standard of the Supreme Court's test for per se illegality,26
and it further obfuscated the difficult concept of market power. Because
application of the per se rule deprives a defendant of the opportunity to
show that his actions did not have an unreasonable effect, the lack of
thorough analysis by the court on these points is distressing.
A final objection to the courts' finding of economic power is found
in the express language of the Supreme Court: "[u]niqueness confers
economic power only when other competitors are in some way prevented
from offering the distinctive product themselves. '27  Read literally the
Supreme Court said uniqueness was not determinative on the issue of
market power unless a legal, physical, or economic barrier existed. 28 The
23. 394 U.S. at 504.
24. Id.
25. Mere volume does not establish market power so long as the sale is not
dependent on the seller's productive capacity. If only one company can meet a custo-
mer's volume needs, the :seller can impose burdensome terms because the customer
has no reasonable alternative to buying from this seller. Such was not the case here.
26. If the market power prerequisite is met, then the de minimis prerequisite
would be tested to prevent an absurd application of per se illegality rules, such as a
finding of a per se violation "if one of a dozen food stores in a community were to
refuse to sell flour unless the buyer also took sugar." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. at 7.
27. 394 U.S. at 505 n.2 (emphasis added).
28. Id. The Court said:
Such barriers can be legal, as in the case of patented and copyrighted products,
e.g., International Salt [Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)]; Loew's
[United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)], or physical, as when the
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court of appeals noted this statement 29 and the Supreme Court's rejection
of the argument that uniqueness alone constituted proof of sufficient
market power. Nevertheless, the court gave great weight to the evidence
of uniqueness, even assigning it the central position in its analysis of market
power by saying: "the trial court was free to evaluate the other evidence
along with the evidence of economic power derived from uniqueness."30
Because the Supreme Court's language recognized probative value in
uniqueness only when a barrier existed, which says nothing about the
probative value of uniqueness by itself, and because the Sixth Circuit failed
to demonstrate how uniqueness constituted evidence of market power in
this case, the court's emphasis on the evidence of uniqueness seems un-
justified.
Another difficult feature of this case was the award of damages.3 ' The
amount sought by Fortner was not based on the higher price of the tied
product as is usual in private antitrust cases,3 2 but represented the profits
lost when Credit foreclosed on Fortner's housing development.3 3 The
damage theory was thus essentially contractual, yet Fortner sued under
an antitrust theory, apparently in order to secure treble damages.3 4 It is
difficult to accept that the lost profits resulted from the tie itself because
the tie was part of the bargain upon which the profit computation must
have been based. Fortner testified he was doing well with the houses until
defects in them made them difficult to sell.3 5 This fortuity, not the accept-
ance of the tie, was the cause of Fortner's losses. Moreover, so long as
competition existed in the housing market, a developer could shop and
select whatever available arrangement benefited him most.3 6 Fortner was
product is land, e.g., Northern Pacific [Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1958)]. It is true that the barriers may also be economic, as when com-
petitors are simply unable to produce the distinctive product profitably, but the
uniqueness test in such situations is somewhat confusing since the real source of
economic power is not the product itself but rather the seller's cost advantage
in producing it.
29. 523 F.2d at 965.
30. Id. at 966.
31. The history of Fortner is summarized in note 6 supra. The amount of
damages had not been an issue since the 1971 review of the case by the Sixth Circuit.
The court there noted that "the defendants raise no question on the present appeal as
to damages, having elected to limit the appeal to the issue of liability under the
Sherman Act." 452 F.2d at 1096. This failure to raise the issue waived it. See, e.g.,
Bumpus v. Remington Arms Co., 183 F.2d 507, 513 (8th Cir. 1950); Moore v.
American Scantic Line, 121 F.2d 767, 769 (2d Cir. 1941).
32. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
33. See note 9 supra.
34. See Dam, supra note 3, at 7-8.
35. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., Civil No. 4392 (W.D.
Ky., filed Aug. 13, 1974), Finding of Fact Number 17. Fortner even returned to
Credit to buy additional houses under the same terms.
36. If a buyer compares each offer and accepts the most favorable, there will be
no damage arising from a tie because any higher price for the tied product must be
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an experienced and hard-bargaining developer ;37 his acceptance of Steel's
offer is at least an indication that this was his best available option. It is
difficult to see why Steel should be held liable for making the offer. Perhaps
the court of appeals cannot be reproached on this point because the
damage issue was not appealed ;38 yet the implications of the ill-reasoned
mixture of contract and antitrust theory permeate the case.
A final problem was Steel's contention that the market foreclosure
required in tying cases was absent here. The court of appeals rejected the
argument saying:
The thrust of the total testimony clearly shows that someone, either
Fortner Enterprises or others for whom Fortner would have handled
sales of houses, would have bought the homes of competitors of U.S.
Steel if no similar credit had been offered, and thus that some com-
petition was foreclosed . 9
The use of the words "someone" and "similar" creates great confusion.
"Someone" is limited by the court to "Fortner Enterprises or others for
whom Fortner would have handled sales of houses." It is unclear who
these "others" are. If other developers are included the question arises
whether a defendant in a private antitrust action can be condemned because
competitors were foreclosed from making sales to non-parties. What is
meant by "similar credit" is also unclear. Is the court referring to the
arrangement between Credit and Fortner, between Credit and other de-
velopers, or to any comparable arrangement involving unrelated parties?
None of these possible interpretations is completely satisfying, especially
because of the ambiguity in the word "someone." This compounded
ambiguity tends to reduce analysis to the level of speculation. An ade-
quate showing of foreclosure is crucial, moreover, because absent such a
public harm, there appears to be no justification for using antitrust law
to award Fortner treble damages.
offset by the bargain on the tying product or it would not be the most favorable deal.
This holds true even when a monopolist imposes a tie, for there can be but a single
profit from monopoly. See Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 19, 20-21 (1957). Although this analysis may fail when transactions
are so complex that the buyer has difficulty making a reasoned comparison, such
was not the case here.
The Supreme Court has said a major harm of tying arrangements is the
market foreclosure effect. E.g., International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392,
396 (1947). The harm is not to a particular individual but to a society which thrives
on competition and suffers if the tie forecloses competitors from a market. If many
sellers institute burdensome tie-ins, the market for sales of the second product alone
tends to disappear. It then becomes more difficult for a new entrant to break into
the business for either product, for it would have to operate successfully in two
markets rather than one.
37. Dam, supra note 3, at 5, 29.
38. 523 F.2d at 967; see note 10 supra.
39. 523 F.2d at 967 (emphasis added).
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Despite the many problems in this opinion, the court cannot be overly
faulted. Fortner's cause of action was essentially contractual, and, as noted
by the dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court, the case should never
have been heard on antitrust grounds. The lower courts, however, were
bound by the Supreme Court's 1969 decision to apply an antitrust frame-
work to the case. Because the Sixth Circuit's treatment of the facts, the
policy, and the law is flawed and because the Supreme Court's own
Fortner decision has provoked legal confusion, academic criticism, and
business uncertainty, there will be much room for improvement when the
case is reconsidered by the Supreme Court in Fortner VIII.
